Civilian groups’ bitter struggle to offer alternative to the war in Sudan
Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan bin Abdullah Al-Saud and representatives of the Sudanese army and rival paramilitary Rapid Support Forces along with other officials pose for a group photo after signing an agreement for a seven-day ceasefire in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on May 20, 2023.
Sudan’s war is a battle between two protagonists: The Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). But there are various other groups, mostly civilian-led that could have had an influence on the direction of the conflict.
And 18 months since the conflict erupted, why have some of these groups paled in influence or struggled to shape a peace path? The short answer is mistrust. But the long answer is complicated.
Take Taqqadum, for instance, which was formed as the war erupted, representing civilian movements. It included groups such as the Forces of Freedom of Change (FCC), the Central Committee that also includes Darfur armed movements of the Justice and Equality movement of Suliman Sandel Faction.
It also included Al Tahir Hagar Sudan Liberation Forces, Sudan Liberation Movement transitional council of Al Hadi Idris, trade unions and other civil society organisations.
Created to end the war through peaceful means, they marketed their idea to regional leaders a third track of mediation and were led by Abdalla Hamdok, a former Prime Minister of Sudan. But their track has not led to much, a victim of the fact that Sudan distrusts most of the neighbours Taqqadum pitched, and they had been too close to the RSF.
Dr Jihad Mashamoun, a Sudanese political analyst and honorary research fellow at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter says Hamdok’ s group has faced own internal differences too.
“Taqqadum is losing influence because of internal differences as a result of the FFC parties taking control over its internal structures,” he told The EastAfrican. That, he added, has produced problems of the transition period where civil society and youth complain about of the FFC central committee parties hegemony over decision making.
"The group pooled most civilian groups that fueled protests against Omar al-Bashir, leading to his ouster in 2019 and formed the civilian arm of the transitional coalition arrangement with the army. Dr Mashamoun says they retain some international backing and still have some leaders that can be trusted yet those wrangles have stalled their path.
In Sudan, traditionally, political alliances often rest on shaky grounds due to the distortions caused by the prolonged military rule that the country has experienced since its independence. These alliances share common characteristics of weakness and lack of widespread acceptance, as much of the Sudanese population has lost trust in political parties.
After the ouster of Omar al-Bashir, a civilian-military government negotiated a peace deal with former armed movements in rural Sudan and implemented stringent economic measures that raised inflation to over 400 percent, exacerbating the food crisis that had initially sparked the revolution.
However, when civilians sought to loosen the military’s grip on the nation’s wealth, the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces staged a coup to remove them from power.
Hamdok was tossed in October 2021, together with his cabinet. These coup leaders, lacking legitimacy and a clear plan to resolve the food and financial crises, also failed to agree on a path forward for the country’s future. They fell out.
Sudan’s civil society is complex, however, reflecting diverse and sometimes contradictory political movements, as well as urban-rural divides.
Civilian actors have demonstrated their ability to provide services in areas where violence has led to a complete breakdown of State functions.
In urban areas, the Resistance Committees—mostly composed of decentralised revolutionary groups—have garnered significant attention for maintaining damaged water and healthcare systems, burying the dead, searching for the missing, and assisting civilians fleeing from violence.
During the December 2018 revolution that pushed Bashir out, most political forces participated under the broad banner of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition.
However, the sharp tensions that erupted between the military and civilians during the transition period following the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in April 2019, coupled with the emergence of new forces after the signing of the peace agreement with armed movements in October 2020, caused major disruption to civilian unity.
Divisions deepened further in the weeks leading up to the October 25, 2021, coup, resulting in the FFC splitting into two factions.
One faction included most political, professional, and civil organisations from the original coalition, while the other, backed by former regime elements and the Muslim Brotherhood, was led by signatories of the Juba Agreement, excluding former Sovereign Council members Al-Hadi Idris and Tahir Hajar.
Sudan also has the Democratic Bloc, which includes armed movements led by Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim and Darfur Governor Minni Arko Minnawi, along with smaller groups loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood, has supported the army and advocated for the continuation of the war.
The Democratic Bloc consists of several armed groups that signed peace agreements, political parties, tribal groups, and factions loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood, whose 30-year rule was overthrown by popular protests in April 2019.
The bloc supported the October 25, 2021, coup, and many of its components joined the military-led government formed thereafter. Some of the armed movements within this coalition have aligned with the army in its current war against the RSF.
“The second group have not much credibility as they supported the coup against the transition government in 2021,” Mashamoun said.
Now there are reports that the Islamists militias aligned with the SAF have been liquidating civilians and military intelligence and security intelligence, arresting civilians and activists close to the FFC in Taqqadum as a result of belief it supports Hemedti.
One source told The East African the former regime of Bashir is using this chaos as a possibility to end any hopes for democracy by the time this conflict ends.
In the middle of this, Taqaddam expressed support for the Jeddah peace talks and the African Union initiative presented on June 25, which integrates the Jeddah process with proposals from IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), leading to steps that would halt the war and transition power from the military to civilians. It has also supported negotiations that took place in Geneva, Switzerland, in mid-August.
But mediators had reservations about the commitment of the Democratic Bloc for peace, with some officials accusing the group of obstructing the transition to civilian rule by supporting the October 25, 2021, coup.
However, the bloc supports state institutions and the armed forces in defending the nation, opposing attempts to undermine Sudan’s sovereignty and divide the country by certain international entities seeking to politicise aid as a pretext for intervention.
