Sudanese soldiers and enlisted personnel drive a pickup truck mounted with a machine gun on a street in the city of Gedaref, Sudan, on January 14, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in Sudan between the army and paramilitaries.
Sudan has been at war for 18 months. In that period, the US, UN, the European Union and the UK have imposed a set of nine different sanction regimes, all targeting to stall violence.
The latest was on October 8, when the US Department of Treasury sanctioned Algoney Hamdan Daglo Musa, the younger brother of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader Mohamed Hamdani Daglo ‘Hemedti.’
By arming the RSF, his actions have directly contributed to the RSF’s ongoing siege of El Fasher in North Darfur, the Department of Treasury said.
That decision came over a year after the US had imposed sanctions on Hemedti’s brother Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo.
At the time, the US said Abdelrahim was leading the RSF to commit “acts of violence and human rights abuses, including the massacre of civilians, ethnic killings, and use of sexual violence.”
Over time, various entities, including companies associated with the RSF and its nemesis Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) have been targeted with sanctions, including asset freeze and travel bans. But they have had little impact on the scale of violence.
On September 11, the UN Security Council extended an arms embargo on Sudan’s Darfur region, where war crimes are said to have been committed 20 years ago.
UN experts said earlier this year that war crimes have been repeated there and in other areas as fighting between militia associated with SAF and RSF escalated.
“This adoption sends an important signal to them that the international community remains focused on their plight and is committed to advancing peace and security in Sudan and the region,” the US said after the sanctions regime was extended by a year.
The UN sanctions are meant to restrict the movement of arms into Darfur and individuals or entities contributing to or complicit in catalysing activities in Sudan are to be sanctioned.
“All of this is critical to helping end the escalating conflict, alleviate the humanitarian catastrophe and put Sudan back on the path to stability and security,” the US argued.
But even the UN admitted the sanctions will be a tool only, not an end to the conflict. One reason the violence keeps flaring even after the sanctions are tightened, experts argue, is that those imposing them do not understand how the warring factions operate.
“US sanctions have been ad hoc and episodic at best, seemingly intended to punish individual criminal acts, like with the recent targeting of mid-level RSF commanders, but remaining largely divorced from driving toward any stated strategic objectives,” argued Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow for the Africa Programme at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a US think tank.
“This ‘steady drumbeat’ approach appears more intended to only signal that ‘Washington remains engaged’ rather than to deliver the message that ‘Washington is serious’…Sadly, US sanctions look neither serious nor engaged and have not brought about the intended behavioural change from the warring side,” he argued in a recent blog.
According to US Department of Treasury, “the ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behaviour.” But the behaviour of warring factions has hardly changed for the better.
Sudan’s war began on April 15, 2023, but the US had been trying to forestall the violence more than a year before that. On March 1, 2022, Washington had targeted the Central Reserve Police (CRP), a militarised police unit, for serious human rights abuse in the aftermath of the October 25, 2021, military takeover.
Then US Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E Nelson said at the time the crackdown on civilians was “exacerbating the crisis in Sudan and are a direct contradiction to the Sudanese security services’ stated commitment to participate constructively in a facilitated process to resolve Sudan’s political crisis and return to a democratic transition.”
Throughout these sanction regimes, various UN reports has confirmed that human rights violations against civilians have surged by 30 percent since the sanctions were imposed, underscoring their ineffectiveness in curbing the conflict.
Writing in War on the Rocks, Tim Liptrot from the Georgetown University argued the sanctions regime by the US is a double-edged sword, which means Washington should weigh on calls for toughening sanctions.
“However, if the United States successfully isolates the large armed groups, it will inadvertently empower smaller groups and breakaways. That risks transforming a two-sided war into a multipolar conflict. Once Sudan enters anarchy like the Central African Republic and Somalia, US peace and security goals will become even more difficult to achieve,” he said.
One other reason for the limited effectiveness of Western and international sanctions is the presence of loopholes and exceptions, which make enforcement optional rather than mandatory.
Individual countries can adjust the level of enforcement based on their own national interests. Moreover, targeted entities have become adept at circumventing sanctions, particularly when it comes to freezing financial assets.
Many have developed alternative funding streams to sustain their military operations, including complex informal networks that rely on gold smuggling and arms trafficking.
These methods, combined with the use of cryptocurrencies and international intermediaries, have enabled the continued flow of arms despite sanctions.
Algoney was sanctioned for alleged involvement in purchasing weapons and military equipment for the RSF.
But countries such as the UAE, Iran and Russia have so far defied any embargos on Sudan by shipping weapons there, even though they publicly deny it.
The history of US sanctions on Sudan dates back to August 1993, when the US State Department designated Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism.
This was followed by an executive order from President Bill Clinton, freezing Sudanese assets in US banks, banning the export of US technology to Sudan, and prohibiting US companies from investing or engaging in economic cooperation with the country.
According to Sudanese officials, these sanctions caused significant economic damage.
Similarly, sanctions targeting Sudanese individuals wanted by the International Criminal Court since 2002 have not deterred war crimes in the country.
Perpetrators have continued to evade justice, while the diplomatic nature of these sanctions has proven ineffective. The warring leaders in Sudan disregard legal frameworks, often preferring to fight to the death.
They frequently depict sanctions as political or personal attacks, using them to mobilise public support by exploiting the emotions and ignorance of traditional communities.
Lately, however, US officials have been speaking of sanctions to be supported by other tools.
Tom Perriello, US Special Envoy for Sudan, admitted Sudan’s war has been frustrated by external entities “pouring fuel on the fire.”
“We will also look more generally at efforts that we can stop that flow (of weapons), particularly from those countries and entities that would support the dissolution of Sudan or the state. So, yes, we will continue to look at efforts to discourage the flow of arms into the country, and more importantly, to get countries to be partners in trying to end the war and help the Sudanese people rebuild the country.”
