The response from Addis Ababa was fast and predictable. As an Egyptian warship unloaded a new cache of military hardware in Mogadishu this week, Ethiopia’s Foreign minister sounded the alarm on the potential risks associated with the weapon deliveries.
Taye Astke Selassie warned that the weapons, coming into Somalia after an August 2024 joint security agreement between Egypt and Mogadishu, could escalate conflict.
There was also the added risk that the weapons would not be secure and could end up in the wrong hands.
Given Ethiopia’s standoff with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Gerd), and the recent spat over Addis’ agreement with Somaliland for sea access, it might be difficult to separate Cairo’s motivation and role in Somalia’s military reconstruction from its need to encircle Ethiopia in event of a flare-up over the Gerd.
Objectively, the arms deliveries can be defended as legitimate, even though heavy weapons are normally stocked to deter external aggression.
For the same reason, far from what Addis alleges, they would hardly be of any value to al Shabaab at this point in its evolution.
As a post-conflict maritime nation, Somalia has a genuine need to rebuild its security apparatus, including the military. That requires a mix of defensive and offensive weapons, with some designed to manage internal threats and others to counter external aggression.
If it is any comfort, the deliveries have not been covert, but rather transparent as envisaged, after the UN Security Council’s lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia last December.
For the peace of mind of its neighbours and regional partners, Mogadishu could go the extra mile by lifting the veil further, to provide an idea of the mix of the incoming weaponry.
Still, there’s reason to watch Somalia with a keen eye. Mogadishu and Cairo have recently adopted a particularly belligerent posture.
With ongoing tensions with the semiautonomous region of Somaliland and Ethiopia to the north, Kenya to the south, and Egypt nursing a grudge with a major rival in the mix, Somalia is a potential tinderbox.
That is why it should not just be left on its own. The East African Community, to which Somalia became the latest subscriber, should be more proactive and set some ground rules.
First and foremost, the EAC should offer to become the guarantor of Somalia’s security against external threats. That would preclude the need for Egypt to assume an expanding role in Somalia’s security architecture.
Second, the Gerd is already a fact, and much as Cairo has a right to water security, Ethiopia has an equal right to energy security. Only a recognition of these fused interests can lead to peaceful coexistence.
So far, the dam has been filled. The focus should now shift to monitoring how Addis operates the massive water reservoir.
There is also a need for Cairo and Mogadishu to dial down on their angry rhetoric. Without these adjustments to their positions, Egypt and Somalia risk looking like warmongers.